T he recent publication by Nissen et al., 1 and its accompanying editorial 2 regarding a signal of cardiovascular risk associated with rosiglitazone deriving from a meta-analysis of summary data from the composite of completed randomised clinical trials, has spawned a degree of chaos across the broad medical and societal landscape: regulatory, industry science, investigators, clinicians, patients, lay press, the public, Wall Street and the floor of the US Congress. While some key observations, concepts and interpretations may be drawn from these publications, they have to be interpreted with all the acknowledged limitations and should be placed rationally into a scientific and clinical context. Instead, and unfortunately, a hysterical widespread reaction has ensued.
The two most informative components of the study are first, the recognition of a signal of cardiovascular concern within the rosiglitazone database, and second, the consideration of these observations as a symptom of fundamentally flawed regulatory oversight of diabetes drug development and registration that relies exclusively on haemoglobin A 1C (HbA 1C ) as the only requisite efficacy parameter with no requirement for clinical outcomes data -a problem spanning the field of diabetes and in no way limited to rosiglitazone.
On the first point, quantitatively small and statistically unstable suggestions of cardiovascular (CV) risk were observed from both of the two largest studies of rosiglitazone: that is, the Diabetes Reduction Assessment with Ramipril and Rosiglitazone Medication (DREAM) trial 3 and A Diabetes Outcome Progression Trial (ADOPT), 4 summarised in table 4 of the Nissen paper. 1 However, considering these observations along with their uncertain validity based on such small numbers of events, combining them with data from 40 studies with extremely few investigatorreported and often unconfirmed CV events (many studies with only one reported event) of extreme statistical uncertainty, executing a flawed meta-analysis that required sophisticated statistical handling for data from all but two of the 44 studies analysed and, in so doing, imagining that this yields substantially more statistical certainty/validity than that which can be derived subjectively considering data from the DREAM and ADOPT studies alone is inappropriate and somewhat naive. There is no question that a signal exists within the data and, with regard to DREAM and ADOPT, that it extends beyond the analysed myocardial infarction (MI) and cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk events, but it also includes signals in the wrong direction for other CVD event risks (revascularisation, stroke, peripheral vascular disease and heart failure). 3, 4 These data have to be considered in the context of two key facts: a) GlaxoSmithKline has submitted its meta-analysis of CV events based on patient-level data (i.e. much more statistically rigorous) to the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), which has reviewed and will continue to review these data; and b) three large-scale randomised cardiovascular clinical outcomes trials are presently underway that include rosiglitazone therapy as a randomised (Rosiglitazone Evaluated for Cardiac Outcomes and Regulation of Glycaemia in Diabetes [RECORD] trial) 5 or non-randomised (Bypass Angioplasty Revascularization Investigation 2 Diabetes [BARI 2D] 6 and Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes [ACCORD] trial) 7 protocolspecified study treatment. The data safety monitoring committees of these trials, two of which are National Institutes of Health (NIH)-sponsored, are evaluating these issues at regular intervals during the trials. Given this systematic network for overseeing safety that includes GlaxoSmithKline, the FDA, clinical investigators and the NIH, my faith in the diligence of this systematic safety surveillance in the context of large-scale clinical outcomes trials designed to evaluate the question at hand formally eclipses the information from the extremely uncertain meta-analysis results. The downside of this error may well jeopardise and completely undermine these critical research programmes -our only hope of rigorously assessing the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of this uncertain CV safety signal -and reports have already been made regarding potential and realised attrition within the RECORD study. Similarly, the fact that the recent publications have generated so much controversy and debate reflects the uncertainty regarding cardiovascular safety and risk that exists across the field of diabetes interventions, driven exclusively by the acceptance at the regulatory level and among physicians treating diabetes of HbA 1C as the only requisite end point. This is where the present and ongoing discussion should be focused at all levels, and applies to all glycometabolic drugs, rosiglitazone being only one of them. With the single exception of the Prospective Pioglitazone Clinical Trial in Macrovascular Events (PRO-Active) study, 8 a post-marketing randomised clinical trial evaluating the effect of pioglitazone versus placebo on major adverse cardiovascular events, no prior large-scale clinical outcomes trial in the history of diabetes research has been designed and executed to evaluate the effect of glucose management on cardiovascular clinical outcomes. Likewise, based on the regulatory and clinical reliance on HbA 1C as the principal efficacy measure, the vast majority of data in the microvascular disease realm are based on intermediates of disease (such as albuminuria and retinal photography) instead of clinical events (such as dialysis, blindness and amputation). At day's end, the MEDICINE AND THE MEDIA Rosiglitazone and cardiovascular disease: an epidemiologist's perspective strategy of managing blood glucose remains a clinical imperative and very likely in aggregate yields much greater good than harm, yet this paradigm continues to be fundamentally supported by extremely scarce microvascular disease outcomes evidence and effectively no cardiovascular disease outcomes evidence. Hopefully, we as an investigative and clinical community will channel all the emotion and hysteria in the wake of these recent published observations regarding rosiglitazone towards evolving the paradigm to transition to the generation and application of a clinical outcomes evidence base for the increasingly prevalent, morbid and mortal disease that is type 2 diabetes.
More specifically, several aspects of the Nissen metaanalysis warrant consideration, beyond the limitations discussed by the authors and editorialists. First, the overt exclusion of summary data presented in table 4 must be reconciled by the authors; that is, summing the column numerators and denominators and calculating the overall 'net' CV risk. If this is done with myocardial infarction risk, the totals are 86 MIs among 14,371 rosiglitazone-treated subjects (0.598%) versus 72 MIs among 11,634 control subjects (0.619%). That is, without the statistical smoke-and-mirrors of a complex and fundamentally limited meta-analysis, the actual net event rates suggest a relative 3.4% lower MI risk associated with rosiglitazone. Admittedly, this 'simple' calculation is less robust than formal meta-analysis, as it does not appropriately weight the events from separate studies in the comparison; but when the 'simple' calculation is contrasted with a clearly suboptimal meta-analytic approach and goes qualitatively in the opposite direction, it certainly warrants further consideration and clarification and subjectively undermines the validity of the meta-analysis.
As has been discussed by others in the lay and professional media, another flaw of the data as presented is the use of point estimates to present results in the absence of clear context of absolute risk differences. Given the qualitatively different results, as discussed above, between summing event risks and meta-analysis, it is not possible to calculate the absolute risk differences accurately based on the published data for either end point. What can be estimated, though, are these numbers for the pooled small studies and for DREAM and ADOPT. For MI risk, the numberneeded-to-treat to harm ranges from 345 to 526 patients; for CV death, the range is 526 to 2,500 patients. So, if these estimates are accurate (a very big 'if'), then one has to assume that rosiglitazone has effectively no clinical benefit whatsoever to offset this potentially serious but rare complication. Herein lays the crux of the problem, most clearly evidenced by the fact that 116 clinical studies were considered for this meta-analysis; not one of them is a clinical outcomes study and, to date, rosiglitazone has no proven benefit on any clinical outcomes beyond HbA1c reduction, therefore we have to consider these data as an unopposed clinical risk signal.
Finally, I think it is essential to underscore that this is an analysis of the rosiglitazone database, NOT the thiazolidinedione database. In other words these data -valid or notshould not be assumed to reflect a class effect. To the contrary, based on the PROactive study, 8 pioglitazone has the most statistically robust clinical trial data evaluable among all diabetes therapies. That study compiled more than 1,000 major adjudicated adverse cardiovascular events and more than 600 episodes of cardiovascular death/MI/stroke on which to base the comparative analyses. Granted, the study failed to achieve the primary end point and a significant heart failure signal was observed and has to continue to be considered, but the precision of the estimates is comparable to most cardiovascular interventions, where most randomised trials accumulate 600 to 1,000 events to ensure statistical power. In contrast to PROactive, the United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) metformin substudy, 9 the foundation of CV outcomes evidence for metformin, accumulated only 251 MIs over three treatment groups (conventional care vs. insulin/sulfonylurea vs. metformin) and only 52 CV deaths. Therefore, while the estimates of relative risk reductions are large and statistically significant, the certainty of the observations is somewhat less robust.
In conclusion, the meta-analysis results are provocative but far from definitive, and must be interpreted as hypothesis-generating. To make a silk purse from a sow's ear, we now have the opportunity to advance the dialogue and evolve the paradigm to shift reliance on an unvalidated intermediate biomarker (i.e. HbA 1C ) towards generation and application of clinical outcomes evidence. We presently are at a point in diabetes that we were at prior to 1994 in the cholesterol field; the completion of the Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S) 10 heralded a transition from biological probability and promise of low-density lipoprotein (LDL) lowering to scientific and statistical certainty regarding the clinical safety and efficacy of the statins. As we are just gaining momentum toward that end in diabetes, with more than 50,000 diabetic patients presently enrolled worldwide in cardiovascular clinical outcomes studies, we should be cautious not to undermine those efforts with sensationalised and alarmist reports yielding hysterical media and political communications, ultimately causing panic at the patient level, but channel the passion and enthusiasm into integrated efforts to fix what is ailing us.
